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Abstract
Covering and packing problems can be modeled as games to encapsulate interesting social and en-
gineering settings. These games have a high Price of Anarchy in their natural formulation. However,
existing research applicable to specific instances of these games has only been able to prove fast con-
vergence to arbitrary equilibria. This paper studies general classes of covering and packing games with
learning dynamics models that incorporate a central authority who broadcasts weak, socially beneficial
signals to agents that otherwise only use local information in their decision-making. Rather than illus-
trating convergence to an arbitrary equilibrium that may have very high social cost, we show that these
systems quickly achieve near-optimal performance.
In particular, we show that in the public service advertising model of [1], reaching a small constant
fraction of the agents is enough to bring the system to a state within a logn factor of optimal in a broad
class of set cover and set packing games or a constant factor of optimal in the special cases of vertex cover
and maximum independent set, circumventing social inefficiency of bad local equilibria that could arise
without a central authority. We extend these results to the learn-then-decide model of [2], in which agents
use any of a broad class of learning algorithms to decide in a given round whether to behave according to
locally optimal behavior or the behavior prescribed by the broadcast signal. The new techniques we use
for analyzing these games could be of broader interest for analyzing more general classic optimization
problems in a distributed fashion.
1 Introduction
Set covering and packing problems are important and interesting not only from a classical optimization
point of view, but also as a game theoretic framework for analyzing social problems in which willful agents
are inherent cost minimizers and for solving engineering systems problems in which programmable agents
have some degree of autonomy in seeking solutions to distributed optimization problems. In this paper, we
model covering and packing problems as games, and we use models from learning theory to describe local
decision making by players in these games. As opposed to previous work, we are interested in demonstrating
convergence not to arbitrary local equilibria but to states that are low cost relative to the global optimum.
We accomplish this by incorporating a globally-informed central authority into natural behavior dynamics.
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Problem. Given a universe of elements with associated costs and a collection of sets of these elements, the
minimum weighted set cover optimization problem is to choose the lowest cost subset of elements such that
each set is represented by at least one chosen element. While this problem is NP-hard, good approximation
algorithms exist. However, such algorithms tend to be centralized in nature and require global knowledge.
Game. We analyze a setting in which a central authority knows a good approximation, but elements are
modeled as only locally aware agents with cost functions representing a natural distributed game interpre-
tation of the core optimization problem. We generalize the problem by not requiring total coverage, rather
the importance of covering a given set is determined by its set weight. Each element i that chooses to be
on incurs his own cost ci, and each element i that is off pays the sum of the weights of sets he participates
in that do not contain any other on element. If the element costs are all smaller than the set weights, then
the cost-minimizing set of on elements is also the optimal set cover. If additionally each set is of size two,
then this is the special case of a minimum weighted vertex cover problem. By simply redefining the cost
structure so that i pays ci if he is off and the sum of weights of fully-covered sets he participates in if he is
on, we can interpret this new game as a packing problem with maximum independent set as a special case.
Social and engineering applications. Our motivation for this game theoretic approach is two-fold. The
first setting is a social one in which agents have inherent costs associated with being on or off that correlate
with the social objective. As a concrete example, suppose government wishes to set up a network of offices,
say homeless shelters, that perform some service to the local community. Society would like the lowest
cost solution that adequately addresses the needs of most communities, but for political reasons it may not
be possible to enforce an optimal solution in a top-down manner. Furthermore, individual counties have
competing interests in that they desire their own area to be served but incur some cost by opening a shelter.
Another motivation is the setting in which non-autonomous agents are programmed to make decisions
based on their surroundings. The extensive literature on cooperative control has shown that in this setting
many optimization problems can be conveniently solved in a distributed fashion by endowing agents with
artificial individual objective functions and cost-minimizing behavior. Many of these games and dynamics
models result in convergence to a Nash equilibrium, or local optimum. In particular, several papers have
modeled sensor networks as a special case of our set cover game. The elements are autonomous sensors,
and a geographic region is a set consisting of elements corresponding to sensors that could cover that region.
A sensor that is on is charged some fixed cost, whereas a sensor that is off is charged a cost proportional to
the number or importance of its adjacent regions that are uncovered by any other sensor. This application
is particularly well-suited for cooperative control because sensors can only observe the behavior of other
sensors in their neighborhoods, and the structure of the network may not be known ahead of time, making it
impossible for a central designer to program the sensors with an optimal solution.
Equilibrium quality and dynamics models. Much of the work on cooperative control and dynamics-
based algorithmic game theory only guarantees that systems converge to some equilibrium. Many games,
however, have a high Price of Anarchy (PoA), where PoA means the worst case ratio between the social
cost in an equilibrium and that of the global optimal configuration (see Section 2.1 for its formal definition).
The following special case illustrates that PoA is Ω(n) in our set cover game. Suppose n agents (or players)
are charged some amount c < 1 when they are on and otherwise penalized 1 for every incident uncovered
set. Then a star graph in which vertices are agents and edges are sets has a global optimum with only the
center on, yielding social cost c, compared to a low quality Nash Equilibrium in which only the center is off,
yielding social cost c(n− 1).
The more general problem of dynamics for games with high PoA is addressed in [1, 2], in which authors
propose three models of distributed and semi-selfish social behavior in a general repeated game setting.
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The models share the common feature that a central authority has knowledge of some joint strategy profile
with low social cost, and this authority broadcasts this strategy in the hopes that players will adopt their
prescribed strategies. Specifically, the public service advertising model (PSA) of [1] assumes that each
agent independently has an α probability of receiving and temporarily adopting the advertising strategy.
Those that do not receive and adopt their prescribed strategy behave in a myopic best response manner. This
model is well-suited for an engineering systems setting, where we do not expect all components to receive
the central authority’s signal. The learning models of [2] assume that each agent uses any of a broad class
of learning algorithms to continually choose between acting according to their local best response move and
their broadcasted signal. In the learn-then-decide (LTD) model, agents eventually commit to one of these
options. These models are better motivated by a social setting where agents that are only locally aware are
interested in exploring the advertising strategy with the hopes that it will benefit them personally. These
papers provide high quality guarantees for particular games, including fair cost-sharing and party affiliation
games.
Our results. The positive theoretical guarantees about social welfare in the outcomes of the games studied
in the advertising and learning models of [1, 2] serve as motivation to use these models in studying our
general general classes of set cover and packing games, which apply to engineering systems applications
such as sensor networks as well as more purely game theoretic settings. For the case where costs of agents
and weights of sets are bounded below and above by constants, we show the following:
R1. In vertex cover games1, we show that for any advertising strategy sad,
the dynamics of agents converges to a state of expected cost O(cost(sad)) in PSA and LTD models.
R2. In set cover games, we show that for any advertising strategy sad,
the dynamics of agents converges to a state of expected cost
{
O(∆2 · cost(sad)2) in PSA model
O(∆22 · cost(s
ad)2) in LTD model
,
where ∆2 is the maximum number of sets containing given two agents.
R3. In set cover games, we show that for a specific advertising strategy sad,
the dynamics of agents converge to a state of cost O(cost(sad)) with high probability in PSA model.
Moreover, we present a poly-time algorithm to find such a specific sad of low cost, i.e.
cost(sad) = O(∆2 log n ·OPT ), where OPT is the optimal (social) cost.
Furthermore, we emphasize that all the above convergence guarantees happen in polynomial number
of steps in terms of the number of agents. As we mentioned earlier, without such advertising strategies,
agents can be an inefficient equilibrium state of cost Ω(n) · OPT , even restricted to vertex cover games
(i.e. ∆2 = 1). We also discuss extensions to the case where the costs of agents and weights of sets are not
bounded below or above by constants.
1As mentioned earlier, a set cover game where each set has size 2 is called a vertex cover game, and in such games equilibria
have natural connections to vertex covers in the graph induced by the sets (i.e. edges).
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Related work. Achieving global coordination in distributed multi-agent systems is a central problem of
control theory with multiple real-world applications (see [16] and references therein). More specifically,
several papers consider game theoretic formulations of covering problems which are inspired by practical
sensor network problems [15, 11, 14, 3]. In particular, [3] analyzes a game that is a specific case of the prob-
lem addressed in this paper. However, [3] and many other control theory papers guarantee only convergence
to stable states which are locally optimal. Since these games often have a high Price of Anarchy [10, 13],
the results do not translate to global performance guarantees.
A number of approaches have been explored to circumvent such bad PoA results. In [17] the authors
assume that the authorities enjoy complete control over some fraction of the agents. Similarly, [6, 7] focus
on the problem of identifying and controlling the influential nodes of a network. While we also use a special
type of advertising for improved results in Theorem 4, we do not require particular control over certain
agents. Rather, the models we use from [1, 2] incorporate strategic behavior for all agents. Another line of
research offers stronger performance guarantees using specific learning algorithms that employ equilibrium
selection [9, 4, 5] or cyclic behavior [8]. Unfortunately, these techniques do not yield guarantees of fast
convergence to good states in our class of games.
Our analysis builds on the works of [1, 2], in which authors propose game theoretic models of distributed
and semi-selfish social behavior in a general repeated game setting. The models share the common feature
that a central authority has knowledge of some joint strategy profile with low social cost, and this authority
broadcasts this strategy in the hopes that players will adopt their prescribed strategies. These papers provide
quality guarantees for particular games, including fair cost-sharing and party affiliation games. By using
these models, we do not have to make the hard choice between enforcing top-down solutions (which may
be infeasible in both engineering systems and social settings) and poor performance guarantees. Instead,
we show that for a broad class of covering and packing problems, incorporating mild influence from a weak
central authority guides the system into a near-optimal state when agents are only optimizing locally.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Background on General Games
We represent a general game as a triple G = 〈N, (Si), (costi)〉, where N is a set of n players, Si is the
finite action space of player i ∈ N , and costi denotes the cost function of player i. The joint action space
of the players is S = S1 × · · · × Sn. For a joint action s ∈ S, we denote by s−i the actions of all players
j 6= i. Players’ cost functions map joint actions to non-negative real numbers, i.e. costi : S → R+ for
all i ∈ N . In this paper, we define a social cost function, cost : S → R, simply as the summation of
individual players’ costs. The optimal social cost is denoted by
OPT = min
s∈S
cost(s).
Given a joint action s, the best response of player i is the set of actions that minimizes player i’s cost
subject to the other players’ fixed actions s−i, i.e.
BRi(s−i) = argmina∈Sicosti(a, s−i).
Best response dynamics is a process in which at each time step, an arbitrary player not already playing best
response updates his action to one in his current best response set. A joint action s ∈ S is a pure Nash
equilibrium if no player i ∈ N can benefit from deviating to another action, namely, si ∈ BRi(s−i) for
every i ∈ N .
A game G is called an exact potential game [12] if there exists a potential function Φ : S → R such that
costi(a′, s−i)− costi(a, s−i) = Φ(a′, s−i)− Φ(a, s−i),
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for all i ∈ N , s−i ∈ S−i, and a, a′ ∈ Si. For general potential games, only the signs of both sides of these
equations must be equal. While general games are not guaranteed to have a pure Nash equilibrium, all finite
potential games do and furthermore best response dynamics in such games always converges to a pure Nash
equilibrium [12, 13]. However, the convergence time can be exponentially large in terms of the number of
players in general.
Two well known concepts for quantifying the inefficiency of equilibria relative to non-equilibria are
Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. For N (G) the set of pure Nash equilibria of game G, Price of
Anarchy (PoA) and Price of Stability (PoS) are defined as
PoA = max
s∈N (G)
cost(s)
OPT
PoS = min
s∈N (G)
cost(s)
OPT
.
2.2 Covering Game
Given agents [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, a collection of sets F ⊆ 2[n], costs ci for i ∈ [n], and weights wσ for
σ ∈ F , we describe the covering game G = 〈[n], (Si), (costi)〉 where actions Si = {on, off } and cost
costi as defined in (1) for every agent i ∈ [n]. We let ∆k be the ‘k-th order’ maximum degree of the
hypergraph induced by sets. Namely,
∆k = ∆k(G) := max
i1,...,ik∈[n]
|{σ ∈ F : {i1, . . . , ik} ⊂ σ, ii 6= ij ,∀i 6= j}| .
In addition, we define
cmax := max
i∈[n]
ci cmin := min
i∈[n]
ci wmax := max
σ∈F
wσ wmin := min
σ∈F
wσ.
Before defining the cost functions, we introduce some notation. We say a set σ ∈ F is ‘covered’ in
joint strategy s if si = on for some i ∈ σ. Otherwise, σ is said to be ‘uncovered’. Denote the collection
of sets that include agent i and are uncovered in s with Fui (s), or simply Fui when s is clear from context.
The entire set of uncovered sets is written Fu =
⋃
i∈[n]F
u
i . For σ ⊆ [n], define c(σ) :=
∑
i∈σ ci, and for
F ′ ⊆ F , define w(F ′) :=
∑
σ∈F ′ wσ. Now define the cost function of agent i is defined with respect to any
joint strategy s ∈ S as follows:
costi(s) =
 ci if si = onw(Fui ) if si = off . (1)
Observe that ci expresses how much agent i prefers to cover the sets containing i. For example, if cmax <
wmin, then each agent prefers to avoid the situation that there exists an uncovered sets containing her. As
we explain in Section 5, these covering games can be interpreted as equivalent packing games.
For a joint action (or strategy profile) s ∈ S, let ON(s) and OFF(s) be sets of nodes that are on and off,
respectively. It is easy to check that the social cost has the following simple form:
cost(s) =
∑
i∈[n]
costi(s) = c(ON(s)) +
∑
σ∈Fu(s)
|σ| · w(σ). (2)
Best response convergence. Recall that best response dynamics converge to pure Nash equilibria for
potential games. Now observe that the covering game is an exact potential game with potential function
Φ(s) = c (ON(s)) +w(Fu(s)). (3)
Combining this observation with the social cost formula implies that for any s ∈ S we have
Φ(s) ≤ cost(s) ≤ Fmax · Φ(s), (4)
where we let Fmax be the size of the largest set i.e. Fmax = maxσ∈F |σ|.
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Optimization and equilibrium quality. The star graph example from the introduction reveals that PoA
in the covering game can be very large. More generally, certain covering game instances exist with PoA
Ω (n) even restricted to the simple case ∆2 = 1.2 This motivates the need for efficient dynamics with better
guarantees than convergence to arbitrary equilibria.
As a step in that direction, here we provide a centralized LP-rounding-based poly-time algorithm to find
a low-cost configuration sad for the covering game as follows.
1. Solve the following Linear Programming (LP), and obtain the solution x∗.
minimize
n∑
i=1
ci · xi subject to
∑
i∈σ
xi ≥ 1 ∀σ ∈ F , xi ∈ [0, 1] (5)
2. Set
{
sadi = on if x∗i ≥ 1/Fmax
sadi = off otherwise
.
The following lemma proves that the algorithm is a Fmax⌈cmax/wmin⌉-approximation one for minimizing
the social cost (2).
Lemma 1. The configuration sad obtained from the algorithm has
cost(sad) ≤ Fmax⌈cmax/wmin⌉ ·OPT,
where we recall that OPT = mins cost(s).
Proof. Let s∗ be the optimal configuration i.e. cost(s∗) = OPT . If there exists a uncovered set σ under the
configuration s∗, choose one element from σ and force it to be turned on. Repeat this procedure until all sets
are covered, and say s† be the resulting configuration. Now observe that cost(s†) ≤ ⌈cmax/wmin⌉ ·OPT .
Therefore, it follows that
cost(sad) ≤ Fmax ·
∑
i
ci · xi ≤ Fmax · cost(s†) ≤ Fmax⌈cmax/wmin⌉ ·OPT.
Under the assumption (6), this is an O(Fmax) ·OPT -approximation algorithm to the optimal social cost.
3 Public Service Advertising
In this section and the following one, we show that price of anarchy is avoidable in covering games even
using best response-inspired dynamics as long as these dynamics incorporate some form of suggestion from
a weak central authority that is aware of a high quality equilibrium.
The first model we study in this paper is the public service advertising (PSA) model in [1] in which a
central authority broadcasts a strategy for each agent, which some agents receive and temporarily follow.
Player behavior is described in two phases:
2For example, let ci = c for all i ∈ [n] and let wσ = 1 for all σ ∈ F . Label an arbitrary set of ⌈c⌉ elements L, and label the
other elements R. Define F to be all sets with one element in L and one in R. It is straightforward to check that the solution with
all L on and all R off is a Nash equilibrium with cost c · ⌈c⌉, while the solution with all L off and all R on is a Nash equilibrium
with cost c · (n− ⌈c⌉).
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1: Play begins in an arbitrary state, and a central authority advertises joint action sad ∈ S. Each agent
receives the proposed strategy independently with probability α ∈ (0, 1). Agents that receive this
signal are called receptive. Receptive agents play their advertising strategies throughout Phase 1,
and non-receptive agents undergo best response dynamics to settle on a joint strategy that is a Nash
equilibrium given the fixed behavior of receptive agents. We call this joint strategy s′.
2: All agents participate in best response dynamics until convergence to some Nash equilibrium s′′.
Since our covering game is a potential game and all potential games eventually converge to a Nash equi-
librium under best response dynamics, both phases are guaranteed to terminate. Furthermore, convergence
occurs in poly-time with respect to parameters {n, c1, . . . , cn, w(σ) : σ ∈ F}.3
3.1 Effect of Advertising in PSA
In this section we show that advertising helps significantly in covering games. In particular, we show that
if the advertising strategy sad has low social cost, then the cost of the resulting equilibrium is low even if
only a small constant α fraction of the agents receive and respond to the signal. Theorem 2 formalizes the
general result of this section, and Theorem 4 improves this result for particular advertising strategies. For
the convenience, in this section we assume costs and weights are bounded above and below, i.e.
cmax := max
i∈[n]
ci = O(1) cmin := min
i∈[n]
ci = ω(1) wmax := max
σ∈F
wσ = O(1) wmin := min
σ∈F
wσ = ω(1).
(6)
Theorem 2. For any advertising strategy sad in the PSA model,
E[cost(s′′)] ≤
{
O(1) · cost(sad) if Fmax = 2
O(∆2) · cost(sad)2 if Fmax = O(1)
. (7)
Theorem 2 implies that if sad is obtained from the O(Fmax)-approximation poly-time algorithm de-
scribed in Section 2.2, the following corollary holds.
Corollary 3. There exists a poly-time algorithm to find an advertising strategy sad for the PSA model such
that
E[cost(s′′)] ≤
{
O(1) ·OPT if Fmax = 2
O(∆2) ·OPT
2 if Fmax = O(1)
.
Effective advertising. We additionally consider advertising strategies particular to our game for improved
performance of the model. We say that advertising strategy sad satisfies condition (⋆) if⌊
cmax
wmin
⌋
x⌊cmax/wmin⌋
(
1− αFmax
)x−⌊cmax/wmin⌋ ≤ 1
n2
, for all x ≥ ∆
∗
1
∆2(Fmax − 1)
, (⋆)
where ∆∗1 := ∆∗1(sad) is the smallest number of sets containing a given on element in sad as the unique
on element. We say ∆∗1 is the ‘core’ minimum degree of on elements in sad. Intuitively, the condition (⋆)
means that each on element in the advertising strategy sad ‘solely’ contributes a large number of sets to
cover. We establish the following stronger theorem which implies that agents will reach a state of social cost
O(cost(sad)) at the end of Phase 2 if sad satisfied the condition (⋆).
3This is because Φ is bounded above and below by functions of these parameters and decreases under best response dynamics.
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Theorem 4. For an advertising strategy sad satisfying the condition (⋆) in the PSA model,
cost(s′′) = O(1) · cost(sad) with probability 1− 1
n
, if Fmax = O(1).
The following corollary implies that it is possible to find such an advertising strategy sad of low cost.
Corollary 5. There exists a poly-time algorithm to find an advertising strategy sad for the PSA model such
that
cost(s′′) = O(∆2 log n) ·OPT with probability 1−
1
n
, if Fmax = O(1).
Proof. Here we explain how to find an advertising strategy sad satisfying the condition (⋆) as well as being
of low cost. Observe that any joint strategy s with ∆∗1 = ∆∗1(s) ≥ B∆2 log n for a large enough constant
B (depending on constants cmax/wmin, α, Fmax) satisfies the condition (⋆). Then starting from the joint
strategy with social cost O(1)·OPT obtained from the algorithm in Section 2.2, one can greedily construct a
joint strategy sad satisfying the condition (⋆) with social cost O(∆2 log n) ·OPT (greedily turning off every
agent that is the unique on element in fewer than B∆2 log n sets). For the advertising strategy sad satisfying
the condition (⋆) as constructed above, the conclusion of Corollary 5 follows from Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 2
From (4) and Fmax = O(1), any sequence of best response moves increases social cost by at most a constant
factor. All agents best respond in Phase 2, and hence cost(s′′) = O(cost(s′)). It suffices to bound
cost(s′). At a high level, we do this by providing a bound (i.e. Lemma 6) on the total weight of uncovered
sets that are not uncovered in sad and then we give a bound (i.e. Lemma 7) on the number of agents that are
off in sad but on at the end of Phase 1.
First, let us introduce some notation. We say two agents contained in a common set are neighbors. Let
L and R denote the set of agents that are on and off in sad, respectively. Let Loff (and Ron) denotes the set of
agents in L (and R), who are off (and on) in s′. Let FR denote the collection of sets uncovered in sad, and
let Fbad denote the collection of sets not in FR but uncovered in s′. Then from (2), (6) and Fmax = O(1),
we have
E[cost(s′)] ≤ cost(sad) + E[c(Ron)] + Fmax · E[w(Fbad)]
= cost(sad) +O (E[|Ron|]) +O(E[w(Fbad)]),
where we note that
cost(sad) ≥ c(L) + w(FR) = Ω(|L|) + Ω(|FR|).
Therefore, the following two lemmas bounding w(Fbad) and |Ron| leads to the desired bound on cost(s′),
which completes the proof of Theorem 2 from cost(s′′) = O(cost(s′)).
Lemma 6. w(Fbad) ≤ c(L).
Proof. Each set in Fbad should contain an off element in Loff that is best responding in s′. Hence,
w(Fbad) = w
( ⋃
ℓ∈Loff
Fuℓ
)
≤
∑
ℓ∈Loff
w(Fuℓ ) ≤
∑
ℓ∈Loff
cℓ ≤ c(L),
where the second inequality is from the fact that ℓ is best responding (i.e. its cost exceeds the total weight of
uncovered sets including it since it chooses to be off ). This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
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Lemma 7. E[|Ron|] ≤
{
|FR|+∆2 · |L|
2 +O(∆2) · |L| if Fmax = O(1)
|FR|+O(|L|) if Fmax = 2
.
Proof. Since each element r in Ron plays best response in s′, r should be contained in a set σr as the unique
on element. We define disjoint sets R(1)on and R(2)on such that
Ron = R
(1)
on ∪R
(2)
on
and r ∈ R(1)on if σr ∈ FR. By definition of R(1)on , it easily follows that
|R(1)on | ≤ |FR|. (8)
Now consider R(2)on . LetFoff be the collection of ‘left’ uncovered sets, i.e. σ ∈ Foff if σ∪L is a non-empty
subset of Loff. Hence, by definition of R(2)on , σr is in Foff for each r ∈ R(2)on . This implies that
|R(2)on | ≤ |Foff|. (9)
We let F∗off ⊂ Foff be the collection of sets containing a unique element in Loff. Then, we have
|Foff \ F∗off| ≤
{
∆2 · |L|
2 if Fmax = O(1)
0 if Fmax = 2
. (10)
This is because the number of sets with more than one element in Loff is bounded by ∆2 · |L|2 (remember
that each pair of agents is contained in at most ∆2 common sets). Clearly, there are no such sets when
Fmax = 2.
We now bound the expected size of F∗off. It follows that
E[|F∗off|] =
∑
ℓ∈L
|F∗ℓ | · Pr[ℓ is off ], (11)
where we let F∗ℓ be the collection of sets including ℓ as the unique element in L. Further, we observe that
Pr[ℓ is off ] ≤ Pr[|{ρ ∈ F∗ℓ : all ρ ∩R are off }| ≤ cmax/wmin]
≤ Pr[|{ρ ∈ F∗ℓ : all ρ ∩R are receptive}| ≤ cmax/wmin]
≤ Pr[|{ρ ∈ F̂∗ℓ : all ρ ∩R are receptive}| ≤ cmax/wmin],
where we define F̂∗ℓ ⊆ F∗ℓ such that no pair of sets in F̂∗ℓ have common elements in R and the size of
F̂∗ℓ is not too small i.e. |F∗ℓ | ≤ (Fmax − 1)∆2 · |F̂∗ℓ |. From definitions of Fmax and ∆2, the existence of
such set F̂∗ℓ follows. Since no pair of sets in F̂∗ℓ have common elements in R, the events that all ρ ∩ R are
receptive for ρ ∈ F̂∗ℓ become independent with each other and each happens with probability at least αFmax .
Therefore,
Pr[ℓ is off ] ≤ Pr[|{ρ ∈ F̂∗ℓ : all ρ ∩R are receptive}| ≤ cmax/wmin]
≤
⌊cmax/wmin⌋∑
i=0
(
|F̂∗ℓ |
i
)(
1− αFmax
)|F̂∗
ℓ
|−i (
αFmax
)i
. (12)
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Combining (11) and (12) implies that
E[|F∗off|] ≤
∑
ℓ∈L
|F∗ℓ | ·
⌊cmax/wmin⌋∑
i=0
(
|F̂∗ℓ |
i
)(
1− αFmax
)|F̂∗
ℓ
|−i (
αFmax
)i
≤ (Fmax − 1)∆2
∑
ℓ∈L
⌊cmax/wmin⌋∑
i=0
|F̂∗ℓ |
(
|F̂∗ℓ |
i
)(
1− αFmax
)|F̂∗
ℓ
|−i (
αFmax
)i
= O(∆2) · |L|, (13)
where the last equality is from the following proposition of which proof is presented in Appendix A.
Proposition 8. For constant a ∈ (0, 1) and 0 < c ≤ d,
⌊c⌋∑
i=0
d
(
d
i
)
(1− a)d−iαi = O(⌈c⌉).
Finally, combining (8), (9), (10) and (13) leads to the desired conclusion of Lemma 7, where note that
∆2 = 1 when Fmax = 2.
Proof of Theorem 4
We will use the same notation Ron and Fbad as in the proof of Theorem 2. As we explain in the proof of
Theorem 2, it suffices to prove that the social cost at the end of Phase 1 is O(cost(sad)) with probability
1− 1/n.
To this end, the following lemma establishes the condition (⋆) ensures that all agents in L turn on with
probability 1− 1/n at the end of Phase 1. Under the event, only sets in FR are uncovered and the additional
social cost incurred by agents in Ron. The lemma shows that such additional cost is at most cost(sad).
Hence, this completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma 9. If the advertising strategy sad satisfies the condition (⋆), then
Fbad = ∅ and c(Ron) ≤ w(FR) with probability 1−
1
n
.
Proof. We will use the same notation in the proof Lemma 7. As in the proof Lemma 7, for any ℓ ∈ L
there is some subset F̂∗ℓ ⊆ F∗ℓ such that no pair of sets in F̂∗ℓ have common elements in R and |F̂∗ℓ | ≥
|F∗
ℓ
|
(Fmax−1)∆2
≥
∆∗
1
(Fmax−1)∆2
.Then as we derived in in the proof Lemma 7,
Pr[ℓ is off ] ≤
⌊cmax/wmin⌋∑
i=0
(
|F̂∗ℓ |
i
)(
1− αFmax
)|F̂∗
ℓ
|−i (
αFmax
)i
≤
1
n2
,
where the last inequality is from the condition (⋆). From the union bound, Pr[Loff = ∅] ≥ 1 − 1/n and
hence Fbad = ∅.
Now assume the event that all nodes in L are on. Observe that for each best responding r ∈ Ron, cr is
no greater than the total weight of all sets containing r as the unique on agent. Since we assume all nodes
in L are on these sets are a subset of FR. Further, since there is no overlap in these sets between different
agents in Ron, we can sum over all r ∈ Ron to derive c(Ron) ≤ w(FR). This completes the proof of Lemma
9.
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3.2 Extension to Unbounded Costs and Weights
All the results and proof techniques in this paper naturally extend to general weights and costs. In particular,
one can obtain the following theorem (analogous to Theorem 2) in the PSA model without the assumption
(6) via calculating explicit quantities in each step in the proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 10. For any advertised strategy sad in the PSA model,
E[cost(s′′)] ≤
{
O(∆2 · ⌈cmax/wmin⌉ · cmax/c
3
min) · cost(s
ad)2 if Fmax = O(1)
O(⌈cmax/wmin⌉ · cmax/cmin) · cost(sad) if Fmax = 2
. (14)
4 Learn-then-decide
We now study the set cover game in the learn-then-decide (LTD) model of [2]. In contrast to PSA, agents
in LTD are neither strictly receptive nor strictly best responders in the initial exploration phase, but they
choose one of these options for the final exploitation phase:
1: Play begins in an arbitrary state, and a central authority advertises joint action sad ∈ S. Player i is
associated with fixed probability pi ≥ β ∈ (0, 1). Agents are chosen to update uniformly at random
for each of T ∗ time steps. When i updates, he plays sadi with probability pi or best response with
probability 1− pi. The state at time T ∗ is denoted s′.
2: At time T ∗, all agents in random order individually commit arbitrarily to sadi or best response. Then
agents take turns in random order playing their chosen strategy until they reach a Nash equilibrium s′′
given the fixed behavior of sad followers.
Effect of Advertising in LTD
For the convenience, in this section we again assume costs and weights are bounded above and below, i.e.
the assumption (6). The following result in the LTD model is analogous to Theorem 2 in the PSA model.
Theorem 11. There exists a T ∗ ∈ poly(n) such that for any advertising strategy sad in the LTD model,
E[cost(s′′)] ≤
{
O(∆22) · cost(s
ad)2 if Fmax = O(1)
O(1) · cost(sad) if Fmax = 2
. (15)
Theorem 11 implies that if sad is obtained from the O(Fmax)-approximation poly-time algorithm de-
scribed in Section 2.2, the following corollary holds.
Corollary 12. There exists a poly-time algorithm to find an advertising strategy sad for the LTD model such
that
E[cost(s′′)] ≤
{
O(∆22) ·OPT
2 if Fmax = O(1)
O(1) ·OPT if Fmax = 2
.
Proof of Theorem 11
To begin with, we note that while LTD differs from PSA in both phases, the proof that cost is low in Phase
1 of LTD is very similar to the proof of Theorem 2. However, showing that the cost stays low in Phase 2
imposes new challenges.
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We will use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 2. We first define E = E(T ′, T ∗) for 1 < T ′ <
T ∗ as the event that every element in L updates at least once before time T ′ after every element in R has
updated at least once, and then every element in R again updates at least once at some time t ∈ [T ′, T ∗].
Clearly there exist some T ′, T ∗ ∈ poly(n) such that E = E(T ′, T ∗) happens with the following high
probability, i.e.
Pr[E ] ≥ 1−
1
nFmax
.
Then, we have
E[cost(s′′)] = Pr[E ] · E[cost(s′′) | E ] + Pr[Ec] ·E[cost(s′′) | Ec]
≤ E[cost(s′′) | E ] +
1
nFmax
·O
(
nFmax
)
= E[cost(s′′) | E ] +O(1), (16)
where for the inequality we use the fact that the social cost is always bounded above by cmax ·n+Fmax·|F| =
O
(
nFmax
)
from (2) and (6).
Therefore, it suffice to bound E[cost(s′′) | E ], where our choice of T ∗ is primarily for guaranteeing
that E happens with such a high probability. We first bound the expected social cost at the end of Phase 1
under the event E as below. And later, we will bound the increase in the social cost in Phase 2.
Lemma 13.
E[cost(s′) | E ] ≤
{
O(1) · cost(sad) if Fmax = 2
O(∆2) · cost(sad)2 if Fmax = O(1)
.
Proof. Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 2, we again note that
cost(s′) = cost(sad) +O(|Ron|) +O(w(Fbad)) (17)
cost(sad) = Ω(|L|) + Ω(|FR|). (18)
We again remind that we will use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 2.
Hence, it suffices to bound w(Fbad) and |Ron| in terms of |L| and |FR|. First consider w(Fbad). We
separately analyze the weights of two types of Fbad. First consider a set in Fbad ∩ 2L, i.e. a set consisting
only of elements in Loff. Suppose we attribute the weight of such a set to its element ℓ that updated most
recently before the end of Phase 1. Because ℓ ∈ Loff played best response most recently, the weight of all
sets in Fbad ∩ 2L attributed to ℓ is at most cℓ. Summing over all ℓ ∈ Loff ⊆ L gives
w(Fbad ∩ 2
L) ≤ c(L) = O(|L|). (19)
Now consider a set in Fbad\2L, i.e. a set which has elements in both Loff and R and all of them are off at
the end of Phase 1. By definition of Foff, Fbad\2L ⊂ Foff. Under assuming the event E , the proof arguments
to bound |Foff| in the proof of Lemma 7 identically work in the LTD model (using β instead of α), i.e. we
have
E
[∣∣Fbad\2L∣∣ | E] ≤ E [|Foff| | E] =
{
∆2 · |L|
2 +O(∆2) · |L| if Fmax = O(1)
O(|L|) if Fmax = 2
. (20)
From (19) and (20), it follows that
E [w(Fbad) | E ] =
{
O(∆2 · |L|
2) +O(∆2) · |L| if Fmax = O(1)
O(|L|) if Fmax = 2
. (21)
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Now under assuming event E , one can observe that the conclusion and proof strategy of Lemma 7 also
works for |Ron| in the LTD model, i.e.
E [|Ron| | E ] =
{
|FR|+O(∆2 · |L|
2) +O(∆2) · |L| if Fmax = O(1)
|FR|+O(|L|) if Fmax = 2
. (22)
Therefore, combining these bounds (17), (18), (21) and (22) leads to the desired bound of Lemma
13.
We now bound the cost increase in Phase 2 assuming E . From (4) and Fmax = O(1) it suffices to
provide a bound on the expected increase in the potential function throughout Phase 2, i.e.
cost(s′′) ≤ Fmax · Φ(s′′) + Fmax · (−Φ(s′) + cost(s′))
= O(Φ(s′′)−Φ(s′)) +O(cost(s′)). (23)
The following lemma bounds the expected potential increase Φ(s′′)−Φ(s′) under assuming event E . Finally,
combining (16), (23), Lemma 13 and Lemma 14 lead to the desired conclusion of Theorem 11.
Lemma 14.
E[Φ(s′′)− Φ(s′) | E ] ≤
{
O(∆22) · cost(s
ad)2 if Fmax = O(1)
O(1) · cost(sad) if Fmax = 2
.
Proof. Since best response moves do not increase the potential function Φ, we only consider updates of
agents following the advertising strategy sad in Phase 2. Since each ‘sad follower’ changes strategies at
most once in Phase 2, it suffices to consider a single off -on move (following sad) for each agent in L and a
single on-off move (following sad) for each agent in Ron. For each ℓ ∈ L, an off -on movie (i.e. ℓ changes
his decision from off to on) increases potential by at most cℓ. Hence,
the total potential increase by on-off moves is at most c(L) = O(|L|). (24)
Now consider another type of moves, i.e. a single on-off move for each agent in Ron. For each r ∈ Ron
that first turns off at time t ≥ T ∗, let Fr be the collection of sets containing r such that all of their other
elements are off at time t. Then the potential increases by at most w(Fr) = O(|Fr|) at time t. Hence,
the total potential increase by off -on moves is at most O(∑r∈Ron |Fr|) = O (|∪r∈RonFr|). (25)
We will bound the expectation of | ∪r∈Ron Fr|. To this end, we consider two types of set σ including an
element in Ron: (a) σ has an element ℓσ ∈ L that was on at the end of Phase 1, and (b) otherwise. Observe
that the expected number of sets of type (b) which does not in FR is already bounded in the proof of Lemma
13 by |Foff| i.e.
E[ the number of sets in ∪r∈RonFr \ FR of type (b) | E ] =
{
∆2 · |L|
2 +O(∆2) · |L| if Fmax = O(1)
O(|L|) if Fmax = 2
.
Therefore, we have
E[ the number of sets in ∪r∈RonFr of type (b) | E ] =
{
|FR|+∆2 · |L|
2 +O(∆2) · |L| if Fmax = O(1)
|FR|+O(|L|) if Fmax = 2
.
(26)
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Thus, we only focus on set σ of type (a). Let Fℓσ ,Roff be the sets containing ℓσ and all of their elements
in R being off at the end of Phase 1. Our key observation here is that set σ of type (a) will only possibly
become uncovered when an r ∈ σ ∩ Ron turns off if all but at most ⌈cmax/wmin⌉ sets in Fℓσ,Roff have an
element in R that updates before r updates. Otherwise, ℓσ have too many uncovered sets to turn off before
r turns off (hence, it remains on). For an arbitrary updating ordering of agents in R \ {r}, there are at
least |Fℓσ ,Roff |/∆2 elements that are the first updating agent in some set ρ ∈ Fℓσ ,Roff . Therefore, for each
r ∈ σ ∩Ron,
Pr[σ ∈ Fr | E ] ≤
⌈cmax/wmin⌉+ 1
|Fℓσ ,Roff |/∆2 + 1
.
Using the union bound,
Pr[σ ∈ ∪r∈RonFr | E ] ≤ Fmax ·
⌈cmax/wmin⌉+ 1
|Fℓσ ,Roff |/∆2 + 1
.
Now let Fℓ,R ⊆ F be the sets containing ℓ ∈ L and at least one element of R. Note also that given
E , random variable Dℓ := |Fℓ,Roff | has (first-order) dominance over the binomial random variable X ∼
B
(
|Fℓ,R|
(Fmax−1)∆2
, βFmax
)
. Using this, we have
E[ the number of sets in ∪r∈RonFr of type (a) | E ] =
∑
ℓ∈L
∑
σ∈Fℓ,R
E
[
⌈cmax/wmin⌉+ 1
Dℓ/∆2 + 1
]
≤
∑
ℓ∈L
∑
σ∈Fℓ,R
O (∆2 · ⌈cmax/wmin⌉) · E
[
1
Dℓ + 1
]
≤
∑
ℓ∈L
∑
σ∈Fℓ,R
O (∆2 · ⌈cmax/wmin⌉) · O
(
(Fmax − 1)∆2
|Fℓ,R|
)
= O
(
∆22 · ⌈cmax/wmin⌉ · |L|
)
= O
(
∆22 · |L|
)
, (27)
where the second inequality uses the fact that E[1/(1+Y )] ≤ 1np for binomial random variable Y ∼ B(n, p).
Finally, combining (24), (25), (26) and (27) leads to the desired conclusion of Lemma 14, where we
remind that cost(sad) = Ω(|L|) + Ω(|FR|) and ∆2 = 1 when Fmax = 2.
5 Extension to Packing Games
Notice that our covering games correspond to packing games if we simply redefine the costs such that i
pays ci if he is off and he pays the sum of the weights of fully-covered sets he participates in if he is on.
Roughly speaking, the game strives to find a large packing, which is determined by the set of on agents,
while avoiding fully covered sets. Since we are simply relabeling actions, all the results from the previous
sections apply. The packing interpretation of this problem is easiest seen with the simple example where
sets are of size 2, ci = c < 1 for all i, and wσ = 1 for all σ. In the original formulation of the problem, the
sets of on agents in Nash equilibria are minimal vertex covers. In the new formulation, the sets of on agents
in Nash equilibria are maximal independent sets.
6 Conclusions
In recent years, game theoretic frameworks have provided informative models for analyzing the outcomes
of games among autonomous agents or components programmed as autonomous agents. However, many
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games, including those studied in this paper, often suffer from high Price of Anarchy, meaning that without
a central authority it is hard to induce a state with low social cost. In this paper we study how weak
broadcasting signals from a central authority are enough to induce states with low social cost in a general
class of covering and packing problems. In particular, we show that for any advertising strategy sad, games
with constantly bounded costs and weights converge either in the public service advertising model of [1]
or in the learn-then-decide model of [2] to a state with cost O(cost(sad)2). Moreover, in both models
we show convergence to a state of cost O(cost(sad)) if all sets are of size 2. Furthermore, for particular
and poly-time computable sad in the PSA model, we guarantee convergence to a state within a O(log n)
factor of optimum for any game with sets of constant size. We believe that the techniques introduced in this
paper to analyze covering and packing games could be of broader interest for analyzing classic optimization
problems in a distributed fashion.
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A Proof of Proposition 8
The desired conclusion of Proposition 8 for the case c < 1 follows since d(1− a)d = O(1) for all d ≥ 0 as
long as a ∈ (0, 1) is constant. Hence, assume c ≥ 1. Let a¯ = max(a, 1 − a) and define ξ ∈ (0, 1) to be the
largest constant satisfying
(e/ξ)ξ <
√
1/a¯
For each ℓ, we have either d ≤ c/ξ or d > c/ξ. For the case with d ≤ c/ξ, observe that with c ≤ d, the
desired expression is at most
d
d∑
i=0
(
d
i
)
(1− a)d−iai = d = O(c)
Now consider when d > c/ξ. Observe that
d
⌊c⌋∑
i=0
(
d
i
)
(1− a)d−iai ≤ d · a¯d
⌊c⌋∑
i=0
(
d
i
)
≤ d · a¯d
⌊c⌋∑
i=0
di
i!
Further, we have
d · a¯d
⌊c⌋∑
i=0
di
i!
= O(1) · a¯d/2
⌊c⌋∑
i=0
di
i!
= O(c) · a¯d/2 ·
d⌊c⌋
⌊c⌋!
= O(c) · a¯d/2
(d · e
⌊c⌋
)⌊c⌋
= O(c) · a¯d/2
(d · e
ξ · d
)ξ·d
= O(c) · a¯d/2 · a¯−d/2
= O(c),
where we use (a) d · a¯d/2 is O(1), (b) di/i! is increasing with respect to i for i < c < d, (c) x! = Ω((x/e)x),
(d) c < ξ · d and (e) the definition of ξ. This completes the proof of Proposition 8.
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